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Introduction 
The notion of a ‘Polynesian Triangle’ stretching from Hawai’i in the north, to Rapa 
Nui (Easter Island) in the west and Aotearoa/New Zealand in the south, was first 
posed by European ethnographers attempting to gauge the extent of Polynesian 
settlement of the islands of the Pacific (Kirch 2000: 230-245).  Movement, often 
over long distances, has characterized the history of Polynesian peoples: ‘so 
much of the welfare of ordinary people of Oceania depends on informal 
movement along ancient routes drawn in bloodlines’ (Hau’ofa 1993:11).  Despite 
the impact of colonisation and the development of nation-states, with their 
associated regimes of surveillance and passport control, Polynesian migration has 
continued on to the present day and in fact, it has expanded in scope: ‘The island 
realms have increasingly become arenas of migration, mobility, movement and 
multiple meanings, as individuals and households move – whether physically or 
metaphorically – between different worlds and different spaces’ (Connell and 
Conway 2000:56).  Thus in contemporary times people of the Pacific ‘... are once 
again enlarging their world, establishing new resource bases and expanding 
networks for circulation’ (Hau’ofa 1993:11). 
 
For many Polynesians migration is still framed within a particular spatial context, 
though on an enlarged scale - one which we have termed the New Polynesian 
Triangle. With its apexes in the North American continent to the east, Australia in 
the west and New Zealand in the south, this new Polynesian triangle 
encompasses a particular field through which ongoing Polynesian migration and 
movement continues to occur.  
 
Researchers have been documenting the significance and dynamism of Polynesian 
migration for many years now, and we build upon this work in our article.   
Movement within this New Polynesian Triangle is both multi-dimensional and 
multi-directional.  While it is the movement of economic resources, particularly 
remittances, that has captured the interest of many agencies operating in the 
region, we argue that such economic flows are integrally linked with other flows – 
of goods, ideas, skills, and culture - to form a single dynamic system of 
movement.  Importantly, such flows are not uni-directional (from ‘rich’ to ‘poor’ 
countries) as was assumed in times past. 
 
Furthermore we contend that the literature on Polynesian migration has major 
gaps.  In particular, there is a lack of attention placed on the international 
migration of Polynesians based in metropolitan countries, specifically, New 
Zealand Māori and indigenous Hawaiians. As Polynesians, they too have been 
caught up in the dramatic changes in the region. They share with other 
Polynesians a history of movement, often across great oceans, and a colonial 
past.  They too have moved to remove themselves from sometimes difficult 
circumstances and to explore new opportunities for families and wider social 
groups.1  
 
Rather than seeing the continuing movement of Polynesian peoples across large 
distances as a sign of desperation in the face of the non-viability of small island 
states (as suggested by certain interest groups – see Hughes 2003) or their 
failure to seize opportunities which exist to them within their own country (e.g. 
for native Hawaiians or New Zealand Māori), we regard this movement as a 
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continuation of the exploratory processes which were established centuries ago in 
Polynesian societies.  As contemporary migration theorists are now arguing, 
‘Migration should be seen as … an integral part of societies rather than a sign of 
rupture - an essential element in people’s livelihoods, whether rich or poor’ (De 
Hann 1999:14-15).  We concur with Gough (2006:32), who speaks of movement 
of Polynesian peoples in terms of ‘a culture of mobility’.  Thus in developing ideas 
on the New Polynesian Triangle, we wish to move away from the dominant 
Western discourse of the Pacific Ocean as a barrier to development and 
movement and towards the reclamation of the Ocean as a conduit and source of 
connection and movement for Pacific peoples (Hau’ofa 1993).   
 
In this article we begin by discussing the history of Polynesian migration and then 
raise specific issues related to our notion of a New Polynesian Triangle, including 
exploration of the types of movement that occur and the motivations of 
Polynesian migrants.  We also weave into this discussion contemporary ideas on 
mobility from the international migration literature.  In so doing, we aim to show 
the value of conceptualising movement of Polynesian peoples within a New - 
expanded - Polynesian Triangle. 
 
The Making of the Polynesian Triangle 
The First Polynesian Triangle 
The Polynesian Triangle, built upon the notion of ‘Polynesia’ coined by the French 
explorer Dumont D’Urville in the 1820s (Campbell 1989:14), was the product of a 
long and sustained epoch of exploration and settlement by Austronesian-speaking 
people who came to the Pacific Ocean probably by way of Southeast Asia from 
about 5,000 years before present.  They brought a strong maritime culture and 
were able to navigate long sea journeys.  This long wave of settlement moved 
through the inhabited parts of Melanesia to a hearth in Samoa and Tonga, 
eventually spreading to Eastern Polynesia as far as Rapa Nui (Easter Island), 
north to Hawai’i and finally, about a thousand years ago, south to Aotearoa/New 
Zealand (Howe 2003).  
 
These three island groups defined the corners of a broad cultural group with 
strong similarities in language and culture, despite the evolution of distinctive 
local forms.  The Triangle was neither regular in shape nor fixed in composition.  
There was interaction with neighbouring Melanesian people, as in eastern Fiji, and 
there were later waves of settlement, for example to the Polynesian ‘outliers’: 
small islands such as Rennell and Ontong Java in Melanesia.   
 
One common fallacy that recent archaeological, linguistic and genetic evidence 
has put to rest, was the mistaken belief that this Polynesian migration was a 
haphazard affair owing more to chance than to concerted action (Howe 2003: 92-
138).  Polynesian explorers purposefully traversed the Pacific settling new islands 
and atolls, maintaining extensive trading links across the large sections of the 
Ocean. Proof of this multi-directional travel is no more apparent than in the 
dispersal across the Pacific of the sweet potato (Ipomoea batatas), a South 
American domesticate. In many respects then this first wave of Polynesian 
migration and voyaging is an early example of chain-migration – where 
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individuals or families follow their kith and kin who have already established 
settlements in the new territories and who provide support for those who come 
later.  
 
This pattern of Polynesian migration continued up to and beyond the period of 
European contact. However, rather than travelling on their traditional vessels this 
new generation of Polynesian travelers traversed the Pacific as labourers and 
navigators on European trading and whaling vessels. In addition, Polynesian men 
were recruited (not always voluntarily) as labourers for plantations across the 
Pacific, occasionally marrying into local populations although many often returned 
to their original homes after the conclusion of their contract (Lal et al 1993). In 
this way, kinship networks were maintained even though Polynesian people 
travelled great distances, often for long periods of time.  Many customary 
connections with other islands and distant kin were also maintained, despite the 
fact that these lines of connection were crossed by new national boundaries. 
Colonial control over movement  
During this initial contact period traditional forms of Polynesian leadership 
continued to exert their authority over their peoples, although with some social 
change necessarily occurring due to the growth in number of European traders 
and plantation owners in the region and the uptake by Polynesian peoples of 
European technology. However, with the expansion of colonialism in the 
nineteenth century the Pacific began to be carved up by the various competing 
European and American powers. By the end of the nineteenth century the entire 
Pacific region had been claimed by some or other European or American power.2 
It was during this period, as Polynesians were incorporated into the European 
international system, that Polynesians began to be seen as being poor ‘natives’ 
cut off from the wider world – trapped as they were on their remote islands. 
Thus, Epeli Hau’ofa has argued:  
 
Nineteenth century imperialism erected boundaries that led to the 
contraction of Oceania, transforming a once boundless world into the 
Pacific islands states and territories that we know today. People were 
confined to their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. No longer could 
they travel freely to do what they had done for centuries. They were cut 
off from their relatives abroad, from their far-flung sources of wealth and 
cultural enrichment. This is the historical basis of the view that our 
countries are small, poor and isolated. It is only true so far as people are 
still fenced in and quarantined (Hau’ofa 1993: 10).  
 
While the events of World War I and II saw some changes in terms of who 
administered and ran the various colonial territories of the Pacific, the region 
remained colonised well into the 1970s and the colonial imprint on people’s 
movement remained well beyond decolonisation. Polynesian countries which 
retained strong links with their colonial administrators or rulers received 
considerable economic support from the metropoles and have had access to their 
labour markets.  Thus American Samoans have had easy access to the mainland 
United States, and residents of Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau, Islands 
although governing themselves in ‘free association’ with New Zealand, can access 
New Zealand passports and thus the New Zealand and Australian labour markets.  
Samoans enjoy a special relationship with New Zealand as a former colonial 
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power which gives them some preferential treatment migrating there and 
residents of French Polynesia have the rights of French citizens.  The British have, 
in contrast, restricted access for their former colonial subjects to Britain almost 
completely.   
 
While writers such as Crocombe (1994: 311-12) acknowledge the influence of 
these colonial ties on movement of Polynesian peoples, they generally fail to 
consider the free right of access Hawai’ians have to the continental USA and that 
of New Zealand Māori to Australia.  These rights of access are important in light 
of the way in which the New Polynesian Triangle proposed in this paper is framed. 
Economic nationalism 
The late colonial period, following the end of the Second World War, marked a 
change in Polynesian migration.  This period saw a significant transformation in 
the political and economic direction of development.  It did not greatly change the 
parameters of the Polynesian Triangle but it did markedly affect the volume and 
direction of migration within it. 
 
In the 1950s industrialized countries, including the United States, Australia and 
New Zealand, adopted economic development strategies that drew their 
inspiration from Keynes and aimed for full employment and sustained economic 
growth.  It was a form of economic nationalism, for it often rested on policies of 
economic protectionism, sheltering local industries from foreign competition, and 
it involved strong economic leadership and intervention from the state.  Such 
import substitution industrialization created a high demand for labour.  In the 
United States, some of this gap was filled by Hawai’ians who left home partly in 
response to the appropriation of Hawai’ian land for the tourist industry on the one 
hand, and the United States military on the other (Drzewiecka and Halualani 
2002).  With a requirement of a 50 percent blood quantum to be recognized as 
‘Hawai’ian’ and thus be able to claim homestead lands, many native Hawai’ians 
chose to look for opportunities in the growing industries on the mainland.  Many 
joined the United States military and were stationed on the mainland (Drzewiecka 
and Halualani 2002).  In Australia much of the labour demand was met by post-
war immigration from Europe, but in New Zealand, employers in factories, farms 
and service industries increasingly turned to Polynesian labour.  Māori rural to 
urban migration increased sharply in the 1950s and 1960s as new opportunities 
opened in agricultural processing industries, forestry and manufacturing 
(Barcham 2004). More Māori also took advantage of their open access to the 
Australian economy. Thus while there were only 197 registered Māori in Australia 
in 1933, by 1966 this number had risen to over 6,000 (Walrond 2007).  Economic 
growth continued and, with virtual full employment in New Zealand through the 
1950s and 1960s, labour was in short supply.  Workers from the Pacific Islands 
became more in evidence, cutting scrub on newly-settled farms, processing meat 
in provincial ‘freezing works’ or on the factory floors of South Auckland.  Such 
movement was eased by relatively liberal immigration laws which, as well as 
allowing the free movement into New Zealand of people from the Cook Islands, 
Niue and the Tokelaus, opened quota for Samoa and, in practice, turned a blind 
eye to many who traveled to and stayed in New Zealand.  
 
The movement of Polynesian workers to the United States, New Zealand and 
Australia received a considerable boost with the spread of new transport 
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technologies and infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s.  Jet aircraft operating 
from newly-constructed airports in places such as Rarotonga, Pago Pago, Apia 
and Nuku’alofa linked these places with Auckland, Sydney and Los Angeles much 
more closely than ever before.  Travel became cheaper and much quicker.  Where 
there was open access to metropolitan labour markets (as with people from 
Hawai’i to the US mainland, from the Cook Islands to New Zealand, or from New 
Zealand to Australia), Polynesian people moved to seek well-paying jobs.  They 
could also plan to return home on a regular basis.  Labour migration became a 
much more straightforward proposition and one that no longer necessitated long 
periods of absence or breaks from social networks. 
Another dimension to this late colonial era was the way metropolitan countries 
subsidized welfare and incomes in their Polynesian colonies.  In the Cold War geo-
political setting, it was important for colonial powers (in Polynesia, this meant 
France, New Zealand and the USA) to ensure political stability and social order 
and keep Soviet and Chinese influence to a minimum.  Despite their small 
population size, Polynesian island states were able to exercise considerable 
diplomatic leverage and literally cash in on their strategic value.  Aid levels were 
high – amongst the highest per capita in the world – and this allowed countries to 
maintain relatively large bureaucracies, offer reasonable incomes in the public 
sector and stem some of the flow of migrants.  In addition, there were attempts 
to bolster rural development in both the colonies and metropoles.  For example, 
New Zealand used to purchase much of its tropical fruit from the Pacific Islands, 
extending its virtual protective trade barrier to encompass its Polynesian 
territories.  Subsidization of agriculture and the welfare state at home also helped 
boost rural incomes and slow the rate of Māori migration to the cities (Barcham 
2004).  
 
This era of state-led development in both the Pacific Rim and the Pacific Island 
colonies did much to both raise the incomes of Polynesian people and increase 
their participation in the modern economies.  Although employment was often 
only available in the lower levels of the labour markets, full employment meant 
that wages were good and employment secure.  Choices opened up.  At home, 
there was the comfort of the cultural hearth supported by either aid and 
bureaucracy or the welfare state.  In the industrial towns and cities of the Rim 
there was good employment and schools for the children of workers and their 
relatives.  By the late 1960s, therefore, well-established migration chains were 
bringing substantial numbers of Pacific Island migrants into New Zealand, and 
small numbers were arriving in Hawaii and Los Angeles as well.   
 
In New Zealand, Polynesian migrants were focused in the three largest cities of 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. However increasing numbers of Pacific 
Islanders were also moving to smaller centres such as Tokoroa or Hastings to 
work in primary industries.  There was a also strong push from migrants for the 
education of their children and kinship networks were soon being established that 
linked their old and new homes so that not only were new arrivals able to be 
greeted into the houses, churches and workplaces of their relatives but also 
aunties were able to offer a home to nieces, nephews and cousins while they 
attended schools. 
 
So there was much new movement in this era, but still largely within the bounds 
of the old Polynesian Triangle.  Most movement was from the Pacific Islands to 
New Zealand, or involved Māori rural to urban migration.  A small migration 
stream was also established between Hawai’i and the USA mainland. 
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A new, expanded Polynesian Triangle 
Soon, however, there were signs of an expansion of the triangle’s boundaries.  
Polynesian – including New Zealand Māori - population flows into Australia were 
facilitated by the close harmonisation of Australian and New Zealand immigration 
policy throughout the twentieth century.3  Australia, like New Zealand, was also 
keen to attract new workers for its expanding industries and both governments 
opened up their borders to allow in Pacific Island migrants (Barcham 2004; 
Gibson 1983; Ongley 1981).  Māori and Pacific Island communities began to be 
established in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, in particular.  
 
Elsewhere in the region there were also some small openings.  Residents of 
American Samoa could gain free access to USA and, because of the close kin 
connections between the two Samoas, the Western Seaboard of the USA began to 
become a favoured destination for Samoan people, a movement again driven by 
economic expansion on the Rim and facilitated by new transport links 
(Macpherson 1997).  
 
Hawai’ian migration to the mainland escalated in the 1970s in response to a 
perceived ‘invasion’ by tourists and the growth of the tourism industry, and also 
the failure of the Department of Hawaiian Homelands to allocate homestead lands 
to ‘proven’ Hawai’ians (Halualani 2003).  There were significant ‘push’ factors at 
play, related to the lack of recognition of native Hawai’ian rights, therefore: 
‘Hawaiians dispersed to other spaces away from Hawai’i to realize a stable, or at 
least better, economic living, and to retreat from the ineffective and unjust local 
government and its state agencies’ (Drzewiecka and Halualani 2002: 352-353).   
This has had sometimes devastating impacts on rural Hawai’ian settlements 
whereby ‘… entire Native communities have been dismembered and displaced’ 
(Trask 2000: 376). 
 
This pattern of late colonial Polynesian migration began to transform the region 
but it showed signs of change in the mid 1970s.  Following the oil shocks of that 
decade, the economy of New Zealand in particular slowed markedly and the old 
Keynesian strategies appeared to offer no solution.  Full employment ended and 
one of the first government responses was to turn its attention to its immigration 
policies and practices.  It tightened entry requirements and began to seek out 
and deport immigration ‘overstayers’.  This was seen most blatantly in the 
notorious dawn raids of the mid 1970s when New Zealand-based Polynesians, 
rather than other immigrant groups, were targeted for deportation (Spoonley et 
al. 2003). It was to be several more years before a more fundamental 
examination of the structural causes of New Zealand’s economic woes led to a 
reformulation of Polynesian migration. 
Effects of economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s 
Economic restructuring following neoliberal economic theories became a 
worldwide phenomenon in the 1980s.  The programs of reform and deregulation 
that characterised the Australian and New Zealand economies in this period 
followed a well-established recipe of trade liberalization, deregulation, 
privatisation and an end to the subsidization of private enterprise.  The results 
shook the very foundations of these economies, New Zealand in particular.  
Previously heavily subsidized industries could not compete internationally and 
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either closed or moved off-shore, public service employment was cut significantly 
and welfare services were reduced.  Even Australia seemed to offer little relief, for 
unemployment levels rose there too. The result was widespread unemployment 
across entire economies, with the impact of these reforms being felt particularly 
hard by low-skilled workers in the primary and manufacturing industries such as 
freezing works, where in New Zealand employment fell by some 40 percent (Le 
Heron and Pawson 1996: 142). As these were sections of the workforce where 
the majority of both Australia and New Zealand’s Polynesian workforce was 
concentrated, this period of reform and restructuring thus had a particularly 
dramatic effect on these groups, meaning that large numbers of Polynesians were 
now unemployed.  
 
One response to the economic crisis for Polynesians was for return migration, to 
move back to the islands or rural areas where at least a low-cost semi-
subsistence lifestyle could shield them from the harshness of unemployment in 
the cities.  For Many Māori, such unemployment was a new experience as 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the labour force participation rates of 
Māori men and women had regularly been higher than those of non-Māori.  Thus 
while the labour force participation rate of Māori men sat around 80-85 percent 
for the thirty years from 1951 to 1981, by the end of 1991 it had fallen to only 67 
percent (Barcham 2004: 171).  Many moved abroad to seek out new 
opportunities - the Māori population in Australia had risen to over 26,000 by 
1986.  Here they had become so significant a group that they were sometimes 
nicknames Ngāti Kangaru, Ngāti Skippy and Maussies (Māori Aussies) (Walrond 
2007).  Another option was to move back to one’s tribal homelands.  Thus 
between 1991 and 1996, a time when welfare benefits were cut and 
unemployment remained high, Māori populations in traditional rural areas such as 
Northland and East Coast in New Zealand increased noticeably (Barcham 2004).  
 
Another response to the economic crisis was seen in Hawai’i.  Here, a major wave 
of out-migration occurred in the 1990s in response to the rising cost of living, 
including the cost of houses, and lack of adequately-paid job opportunities in 
Hawai’i.  However, this movement must also be understood as being embedded in 
the ongoing political conflict between native peoples and the state over land 
rights and cultural entitlements (Halualani 2003). As opposed to the New Zealand 
situation, whereby Treaty settlements meant that large tracts of land were being 
returned to some Māori groups and reparations were made by the government, in 
Hawai’i even those with recognized indigenous status struggled to gain access to 
homelands.  Thus in New Zealand, urban to rural migration was a viable option 
for some whereas in Hawai’i, movement offshore was seen as the most logical 
step to enhance one’s opportunities. 
 
For other Polynesians the reforms eventually took on a second aspect, affecting 
even the living standards at home.  Changes in aid policies removed the direct 
subsidy for bureaucracies in the island states (Scheyvens & Overton 1995) and 
aid donors in the region, especially New Zealand, Australia, the USA and even 
France, forced their client states, by reduced and restructured aid packages, to 
undergo the same neoliberal restructuring that they had endured.  The effect was 
painful: in the Cook Islands, the civil service was reduced in one hit by fifty 
percent in 1996 (Koteka-Wright 2007). The effect of neoliberal reforms was more 
severe in small island states than in the metropoles, at least in terms of formal 
sector employment, although access to land and the means of subsistence did 
provide a safety net that was largely absent elsewhere. 
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With unemployment rising in the metropolitan industrial cities, welfare support 
cut in both the cities and (for Māori) in rural New Zealand, and aid reductions 
diminishing employment prospects and incomes at home, it was apparent that 
Polynesian people, hitherto welcome in the industrialized economies during the 
years of expansion, no longer had a secure place there and they suffered more 
than most from restructuring.  Furthermore, whilst the neoliberal agenda aimed 
to open national borders to trade and investment, it did not extend to a 
liberalization of immigration: ‘control over the movement of people has become 
the last bastion of sovereignty’ (Dauvergne 2004: 588).  Although New Zealand 
has opened up to immigration from new source countries, this has mainly been to 
those with financial resources or required formal skills and it continues to strongly 
regulate in-migration from the Pacific (Spoonley et al. 2003:42).  However, this 
may be changing as New Zealand has recently announced a Seasonal Work 
Permit Pilot Policy to help meet labour shortages in the horticultural and 
viticultural industries (Immigration New Zealand 2006). This scheme will provide 
opportunities for Pacific Islanders and others from specified countries to work for 
short periods of time in New Zealand.  
 
While various migration patterns have thus emerged in recent decades, a 
dominant factor is that net migration figures are negative in almost all Polynesian 
countries (Duncan et al. 2006).   Interestingly, however, the Cook Islands too has 
had to bring in more foreign workers in recent years to fill gaps in the labour 
market caused by high rates of out migration.  Here, however, they mainly move 
in to semi-skilled positions in the tourism industry.  Consequently there was a 
doubling of foreign work permits issued in the Cook Islands between 1996 and 
2004 (Koteka-Wright 2007). 
 
It seems, then, that globalization should have affected Polynesian migration; and, 
if anything, led to a contraction of the triangle as former migrants returned home.  
Yet, this paper argues that the reverse has happened.  In an increasingly 
unfavourable geo-political climate, Polynesians have moved even further afield – 
yet this expansion of movement has, for too long, been disregarded.  Hau’ofa has 
argued that  
 
[We must not…] overlook culture, history, and the contemporary 
processes of ‘world enlargement’ carried out by tens of thousands of 
ordinary Pacific islanders right across the ocean from east to west and 
north to south, under the very noses of academic and consultancy experts, 
regional and international development agencies, bureaucratic planners 
and their advisors, and customs and immigration officials, making 
nonsense of all national and economic boundaries, borders that have been 
defined only recently, crisscrossing an ocean that had been boundless for 
ages before Captain Cook’s apotheosis (Hau’ofa 1993: 6).  
 
Polynesian populations are now sizable and significant in Australia and the 
western seaboard of North America and the new Polynesian Triangle now 
encompasses areas of settlement in these industrialized regions.  In this 
movement, Polynesian people have exploited the few options that have been 
opened by former colonial relationships, allowing movement of some to New 
Zealand, Australia, France, New Caledonia or the USA.  They have drawn on their 
skills and experience gained from previous years of employment and they have 
been able to utilize cultural resources to open up new opportunities for work and 
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residence and smooth the transition to life in a new country.  It is to these 
distinctive Polynesian characteristics of migration that we now turn. 
 
In tracing the contours and nature of the new Polynesian Triangle, it is apparent 
that a simple political economy approach cannot readily explain the how and why 
Polynesian people seemed to have been able to adapt to new and seemingly 
adverse conditions within the global economy.  We also feel that a purely 
economic perspective on migration, emphasising factors such as wage 
differentials, is similarly inadequate.  Thus in the following section we turn instead 
to an examination of the way Polynesian people have been able to draw upon 
their cultures, on their kinship networks and their associated social capital, to 
open and exploit new opportunities for movement and development.  In doing so, 
we draw on the international migration literature and ways in which recent 
theorists have attempted to explain movement and flows of people around the 
world.  
 
Themes in contemporary Polynesian Movement 
This section begins with a discussion of the rationale for looking beyond 
economics in understanding migration.  It also details the multidimensional ties 
that motivate movement but which simultaneously bind Polynesian peoples to 
their homelands, resulting in movement that is also multidirectional.  The section 
finishes with a discussion of contemporary Polynesian movement in relation to the 
concept of transnationalism. 
Beyond the economic rationale: the multidimensional nature of 
migration 
In conceptualising the motivations for movement of people within the Polynesian 
triangle, our research concurs with a general trend in migration studies whereby 
researchers are deliberately moving away from the neoclassical economics-based 
studies which focus on movement of ‘rational individuals’ in response to labour 
shortages or greater economic opportunity in the destination site.  Rather, social-
cultural factors can be seen as framing many decisions made about migration, 
and political dimensions also need to be considered (Afolayan 2001).   
 
To date the literature on Polynesian migration has focused overwhelmingly 
economic causes of migration and on associated economic flows.  In particular, 
Bertram and Watters’ (1985) concept of the MIRAB (Migration, Remittances, Aid, 
Bureaucracy) economy has structured both academic debate and policy 
construction in and about Polynesian states in the Pacific.  The traditional MIRAB 
model conceived migration as something of a ‘safety valve’ in the face of poor 
employment opportunities and population pressures on people’s home islands 
(Marsters et al. 2006:33).  It also raised questions about whether development 
can be sustainable in countries where external resource transfers rather than 
productive activity within the country drive the economy.  Whilst the MIRAB 
model did much to highlight the particular characteristics of small island states 
and the close relationships they have with metropolitan patron states, and thus 
argued for a continuation of such ties rather than a neoliberal-inspired weakening 
of state aid and welfare strategies, the model fed, perhaps unintentionally, into 
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neoliberal arguments about the viability of small island states.  Even reworkings 
of the MIRAB model are largely entrenched in the new economics of labour 
migration school of thought (see volume 47, number 1, 2006 of Asia-Pacific 
Viewpoint), which does not appreciate the multidimensional nature of flows 
associated with migration.  As Marsters et al. (2006:31) point out, ‘Cook 
Islanders live in rich networks of flows of goods, people, labour and meaning that 
the MIRAB model does not fully capture’.  Researchers working on Polynesian 
case studies have started to acknowledge a number of significant ‘non-economic 
returns’ from migration (Connell and Conway 2000:53).  Such returns were easily 
identified in a study of the Cook Islanders who had moved to New Zealand in 
direct response to the economic restructuring of 1996: only 38.5 percent of 
respondents felt they were financially better off in New Zealand than in the Cook 
Islands.  However they tolerated this situation because of other perceived 
advantages mainly in relation to health and education services (Koteka-Wright 
2007:114). 
 
One easily identifiable non-economic reason for migration of Polynesian peoples 
has been religion.  This is particularly obvious in the case of movement of 
Mormons to the state of Utah.  There were around 300 Māori families living in 
Utah in 2000 (Walrond 2007).  
 
Neoliberal logic has informed much of the interpretation of patterns of migration 
and flows of remittances, offering only partial – sometimes flawed – insights into 
the reality of Polynesian movement and what it means to Polynesian peoples.  For 
example, much interest in remittances has focused narrowly on the nature of 
expenditure, determining that this was ‘unproductive’ and used mainly for 
conspicuous consumption (World Bank 1993: 3). A number of authors have now 
criticized this stance, including Connell and Conway (2000) who identify a range 
of different uses of remittances and show how they are in fact achieving a wide 
range of development outcomes.  For example, remittances of cash or goods 
(often with associated skills and knowledge transfers) have been used to support 
a wide range of business ventures, from petty trading in the informal sector to 
more substantial enterprises.  When remittances are used to support household 
consumption, this is often used to meet the welfare needs of children and aged 
parents.  House construction through remittances can also contribute to improved 
family welfare or, in cases where the house is then rented out, is a sound 
economic investment (Connell and Conway 2000: 67). Clearly, therefore ‘… there 
is a far richer complexity to remittance practices than the strategic accumulation 
of wealth or underwriting of consumption in a home village’ (Marsters et al. 2006: 
33). Furthermore, economic theories cannot explain why remittances are often bi-
directional.  
 
We thus gain a much deeper understanding of migration and remittances when 
we look beyond economics.  Remittances, for example, can be technical, political 
or social in nature (Goldring 2004).  Levitt (1998, cited in Spoonley et al. 
2003:36) identifies ‘social remittances’ such as the exchange of letters, phone 
calls, and videos between migrants and non-migrants.  Similarly Goldring argues 
that remittances are multifaceted: ‘One can talk about non-economic remittances, 
that is, social, technological and technical or political remittances’ (2004: 832).  
Thus for example a Cook Islands nurse resident in Auckland may return to her 
home island to run the health clinic in order to allow the local sole-charge nurse 
to come to New Zealand for a short time for additional training.   
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According to Connell and Brown (2005: vii), those sending remittances are not 
necessarily motivated by economic principles, rather, ‘They respond to an implicit 
social contract, contribute to human capital formation, and can be seen as a form 
of intergenerational transfer’.  Thus remittances embody flows that often have 
deep cultural significance:  
 
The households that we studied … gave by remitting – sometimes 
strategically but sometimes altruistically, sometimes to redistribute but 
sometimes to secure relations, yet in all cases the act of gifting was 
constitutive, defining and culturally expressive or beyond-self (Marsters et 
al. 2006: 40).   
 
Perhaps one problem here is that in much of the relevant literature the focus is 
on the remittances themselves – their amount, the direction they are going in, 
and how they have changed over time – rather than on the people doing the 
remitting and the meanings they attach to what is being remitted and how.  It is 
only when we focus on the remitters that we get a deeper understanding of the 
motivations to remit, tied up as they are in social and cultural obligations and the 
commitment to keep kin ties intact even across vast tracts of ocean.  It is now 
appropriate to explore the significance of kinship ties in more detail. 
Kinship ties and the building of social capital 
The assumption that the nature and length of migration are determined by 
individual choice is being increasingly questioned in the international migration 
literature (e.g. Baláz et al. 2004; Wong 2004), and instead, the family, kinship 
ties, and social systems are seen as central to new approaches to migration 
(Arango 2000): ‘A recent development in the literature is the emphasis on family 
and family strategies as crucial elements in migration decisions … Migration is 
seen as a form of portfolio diversification by families’ (De Hann 1999: 6).   
 
This family-based approach to understanding migration seems logical in relation 
to Polynesian peoples, whose societies are structured closely around extended 
family ties and for whom the notion of the ‘individual actor’ makes little sense. 
Polynesian migration – both within and between countries - has occurred across 
generations, but equally importantly it is often still, to a large extent, family-
based (Connell and Conway 2000:59).  George Marcus’ early study of Tongan 
migration (1974) identified how adult brothers and sisters who had moved apart 
due to migration had nevertheless maintained important social and economic ties 
which he referred to as ‘dispersed family estates’.  Bertram and Watters 
(1985:511), following Marcus, further highlighted the significance of family 
relationships in directing Polynesian migration, using the term ‘transnational 
corporations of kin’.  They saw these extended families as enterprises which 
operated like a corporation to increase a family’s access to economic resources.  
Similarly, Walker and Brown refer to the existence in Oceania of a ‘migrant 
family-based transnational corporation’ “where the sending of remittances in the 
forms of goods is an integral part of the family’s international trade and 
investment activities” (Walker and Brown 1995: 111).   
 
In demonstrating the importance of family-based motivations for migration, 
Arango (2000) draws on the idea of social capital in relation to motivations for 
movement and continued linkages between kin.  Thus Connell and Conway 
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(2000: 53) call for a reassessment of migration and remittances involving 
microstates in order to see ‘the ways in which return migration and remittance 
investments enrich social capital stocks and enable families to have both 
increased access to opportunities and more flexibility in their livelihood options’.  
Furthermore, when remittances are invested in major family events such as 
weddings and funerals, or in community endeavours such as new water supply 
systems or church rebuilding, this can be seen as meeting welfare needs and 
contributing to the formation of social capital: 
 
remittances and return migrants’ contributions to social and cultural 
capital accumulation strengthen familial and communal networks and ties. 
They not only help to maintain these institutions but enlarge their social 
fields of interaction, incorporating them into transnational, multilocal 
networks of support and empowerment (Connell and Conway 2000:53).  
 
Thus kinship ties are vital factors in explaining why, in a number of situations 
‘mobile populations do not necessarily migrate to start a new life elsewhere, but 
rather to search out new opportunities that may allow them to enhance and 
diversify livelihoods practiced and valued back home’ (Olwig and Sørensen 
2002:1).    
Multidirectional movement 
It is commonplace now to talk of ‘flows’ and ‘movements’ of people, thus moving 
beyond the narrow concept of migration as a unidirectional, linear process 
(Chapman 1991).  Ward has in fact suggested that Pacific migration is best 
conceptualised in terms of the process of anastomosis – a term used in the 
physical sciences to describe the way in which rivers and arteries divide and then 
rejoin to form a web of interconnected channels (Ward 1997: 186-187).  
Increasingly the migration literature has demonstrated that these flows do not 
occur between two static locations, the home country and the destination, rather 
they are fluid over time and space (Marsters et al. 2006).  Thus even 
remittances, long conceived as being sent from the place of migration to the 
home country because of the assumption that people only move for better 
economic opportunities, can also flow in the opposite direction: ‘…economic, 
social, technological and political remittances may be multidirectional and multi-
polar’ (Goldring 2004:805).  
 
Furthermore, return migration is very common among Polynesian peoples. It has 
been noted that the act of migration often makes people more aware of their 
sense of ‘home’, and can indeed strengthen migrants’ attachment to ‘home’ (see 
Al-Ali and Koser 2001). It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that two thirds of 
New Zealand-based Cook Islanders interviewed by Koteka-Wright (2007:116) 
stated that their emigration to New Zealand was not permanent.  They planned to 
move back to the Cook Islands in the future.  The main motivations for people to 
return home were family-related (especially parents and children), the desire for 
a change in lifestyle, and a rediscovery of their identity and culture.  Similarly, 
many Tongans and Samoans with children born in Sydney or Auckland choose to 
send them ‘home’ to the islands to discover something of their roots (James 
1991).  
 
CIGAD Working Paper No. 3/2007 
 
 
 
Centre for Indigenous Governance and Development 
- 13- 
This movement ‘home’ is also evident in populations such as Māori who have 
settled in urban areas.  While some urban Māori in New Zealand move back to 
their traditional lands during downturns of the Australian and New Zealand labour 
market, this mobility dynamic contradicts theories which posit that urban-rural 
migration in general is an attempt by individuals and families to remain in the 
labour market (Mabbett 1988: 666), as many of these migrants are actually 
moving to areas of higher unemployment.4  While for New Zealand Māori return-
migration is at least partially dependent upon labour market conditions it is also 
dependent upon certain cultural factors, with the most important of these being 
the relationship between Māori and their papa kāinga (traditional tribal territories) 
– and the related desire to maintain connections to their cultural base.  The re-
construction of traditional Māori social and political organisations over the last 
twenty years has meant that some have ‘returned home’ to help in this 
revitalisation process and to ensure that their children and grandchildren are able 
to partake of the cultural, social and economic opportunites that these 
developments present. (Barcham 2004: 173)  
 
Many of those returning to their ‘traditional homes’ have brought with them a 
wide variety of skills acquired in their lives in the metropole – be it Auckland, Los 
Angeles, Sydney, Suva or Apia.  This growing skills pool provides a potential base 
for economic growth and development, through both the public and private sector 
that is often unrecognised by bilateral and multi-lateral donors.  Koteka-Wright’s 
discussion with returned migrants to the Cook Islands, for example, revealed that 
30 percent of people had started their own business, and over half of all returned 
migrants were contributing to community development through their involvement 
in NGOs, sports clubs and other community groups (2007: 139).  
 
Among New Zealand Māori this growing skills base of return migrants is only now 
beginning to be utilised by the region’s tribal organisations as they attempt to 
further solidify their organisational and economic structures. Accordingly, the re-
creation of Ngāti Kahungunu tribal structures (a tribe on the east coast of the 
North Island) has had an impact, albeit small, on the regional labour market. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, funds were increasingly made available to 
‘Māori Service Providers’ who would compete for contracts offered by government 
departments to provide services to the Māori community – particularly in regard 
to health services. While some of these providers are private companies, a large 
number are tribally based – operating at either the Iwi or Hapū level, or through 
the new Iwi structures that have emerged over the last twenty years. A large 
number of the key figures behind these institutions are return-migrants who 
learnt their professional and managerial skills in their time away in the major 
cities of Australia and New Zealand (Barcham 2004: 178). 
 
It must also be remembered that this flow of people, skills, goods, and ideas 
across space is an ongoing phenomena. Return migration is thus not necessarily 
the end of the journey. It represents merely one stop along the ongoing journey 
across and through the Pacific that is Polynesian life.  
Transnational flows 
The notion of flows has currency in an increasingly popular concept: 
transnationalism (Faist 2000).  Spoonley et al. explain transnationalism thus: 
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Transnationalism translates into the significant movement of people and 
resources across borders, both formal and documented, and informal and 
undocumented, in order to meet multiple loyalties – to place of residence, 
culture of origin and to traditional, diasporic and non-Polynesian values 
and institutions.  These are apparent in the circulation of people, capital 
and ideas (2003:35). 
 
Transnational communities are likely to have multiple identities and allegiances, 
thus migrants do not necessarily have a strong sense of connection to just one 
country.  Rather, they can be embedded within multiple communities spread over 
a spatial field (Kastoryano 2000).  This leads Lam and Yeoh (2004:141) to refer 
to transmigrants as people whose ‘identities, behaviour and values are often not 
limited by location’; rather, they may be active members of more than one 
nation-state and have ‘simultaneous embeddedness’ in more than one society 
(ibid:157).  Increased international migration has collapsed the way in which each 
country has been seen as the embodiment of a distinctive culture or society 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1992): ‘We imagine…a more fluid system in which home 
and away are blurred and neither “place” represents a decisive cultural condition’ 
(Marsters et al. 2006:41).   
 
With relation to Polynesian peoples and movement, Richard Bedford discusses the 
emergence of ‘Oceanic meta-societies’ (2004: 242-245).  Thus we see that 
Niueans, Cook Islanders, Tongans, Samoans, Tuvaluans, New Zealand Māori and 
others are dispersed across space, and may move relatively frequently, but still 
retain connections to their people:  
 
The assumption of transnational identities by repetitive circulators, the 
continual flows of information, remittances, pocket transfers, skills and 
mobile people which circulate between two or more worlds within such 
extended networks, and the endowment of those involved with flexibilities 
to take advantage of opportunities in both world-spaces, is becoming 
recognized as an important aspect of today’s contemporary global system 
and specifically relations between islands and metropolitan states (Connell 
and Conway, 2000:66). 
 
While transnationalism is not a new phenomenon, it has become more pervasive 
in recent times due to new technologies which have eased transport and 
communication across state borders (Portes 2003).  Electronic means of 
communication have, for example, been instrumental in the flow of knowledge 
and ideas between migrants and non-migrants across vast distances, and this in 
turn has provided new opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurship for 
Polynesian peoples (James 1993). Thus, there is a ‘web of “connectivity” being 
constructed and reconstructed through migration’ (Baláz et al. 2004: 6), and this 
is facilitated in part by new communications technologies.  Electronic forums 
ensure that many members of the Polynesian diaspora - both first and second 
generation migrants - still feel in touch with events back ‘home’.  While the once 
popular Kava Bowl is now defunct, Planet Tonga <www.planet-tonga.com> 
receives over one million ‘hits’ per month, thus providing a popular forum for 
communication among the Tongan diaspora: ‘Tongan participants from all over 
the world…are eager to communicate with one another, share their experiences 
and opinions, and access news and information about Tonga itself, often sparking 
an interest in Tonga that was either absent or minimal before’ (Lee 2004:247).  
Polynesian Café <www.polycafe.com> is also popular (Spoonley et al. 2003).  
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Wolf (2002, cited in Lee 2004:247) claims that such communication forums help 
to keep the idea of a homeland alive through ‘emotional transnationalism’.   
 
The existence of transnational societies also allows people to position themselves 
in particular ways in relation to political issues back ‘home’.  Some Cook 
Islanders, for example, have chosen to migrate to New Zealand at least partly 
because of a lack of confidence in the current government (Koteka-Wright 2007).  
Meanwhile the electronic forums discussed above have allowed people to express 
concerns about their society or culture which could not be expressed elsewhere; 
for example, challenging the Tongan monarchy (Lee 2004).  Overseas Tongans 
are heavily involved in the pro-democracy movement, one way in which they 
show their concern for the long term future of their homeland: ‘The “long 
distance” Tongan nationalists are becoming increasingly vocal … In the not too 
distant future it would not be surprising if at least some of the overseas 
population unites to demand more of a say in the nation building process’ (Lee 
2004:242).  Similarly, indigenous peoples continue to migrate out of Hawai’i at 
least partly in response to lack of recognition of their sovereign rights.  Thus by 
the time of the 2000 United States Census, approximately forty percent of 
Hawaiians (161,507) were living on the mainland, with a strong concentration in 
the Western Seaboard states such as California and Washington (Halualani 
2003:1).  Hawai’ians tend to see more opportunities to fight for land rights, 
sovereignty and retention of their identity on the mainland:  
 
Many see their movement from “home” as an exercise of their political 
identities against the US nation and its arm of power, the local state.  “Off-
island” Hawaiians have therefore identified the diaspora itself as the 
centralized means for preserving a cultural spirit that is suppressed at 
home (Drzewiecka and Halualani 2002: 355).   
 
The Tongan and Hawai’ian examples above relate well to Fouron and Glick-
Schiller’s (2002: 173) concept of ‘long distance nationalism’ whereby people not 
resident in a territory are nonetheless actively involved in the construction and 
maintenance of the ‘nation’ in their ‘homeland’.   
Conclusion 
The concept of a Polynesian Triangle has existed for many years though its 
boundaries, nature and relationship with other cultural groupings have long been 
contested.  This paper has argued that a new expanded Polynesian Triangle has 
emerged, just as contentious as the old but still valuable as a device for analysing 
development and change in the Pacific Island region. 
 
The notion of Polynesia itself, we argue, still has validity.  Although changed by 
migration, development and other processes, Polynesian peoples continue to have 
much in common.  Old linguistic and cultural similarities are augmented today by 
shared experiences and reinforced by new means of communication.  Most 
Polynesian people, due to accidents of colonial history, face relatively open doors 
for migration to metropolitan countries.  In these metropolitan places, though 
aware of their differences, they often share a common identification and place in 
society as ‘Pacific Islanders’.  The old concept of Polynesia though also informs 
the new: discussions of Polynesia in recent years have tended to focus on a ‘Third 
World’ view of the triangle, of the independent countries of the region and their 
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development experiences.  This has tended to overshadow what is a larger set of 
populations; that of the indigenous (‘Fourth World’) Polynesians of Aotearoa/New 
Zealand and Hawai’i, and those other Polynesians who have moved, settled or 
been born in metropolitan countries.  It could even be argued that our concepts 
of Polynesia now need to also incorporate a ‘First World’ view, as evidenced in the 
lifestyles, wealth, power – or conversely, marginalisation - that some Polynesian 
people are experiencing in metropolitan countries. 
 
We argue that the re-insertion of Māori, Hawaiian and migrant peoples into 
discussions of Polynesia is overdue, thus the concept of a Polynesian triangle is 
still valid, although it is a triangle that has become enlarged: stretched at its 
corners to include both the western seaboard of North America and Australia.  
Whereas the original Polynesian Triangle constituted a cultural-linguistic grouping 
that more or less matched the broad spatial domain of ancient oceanic navigation 
and settlement, these new boundaries are an artefact of both colonialism and a 
post-colonial political geography which has given limited rights of access to 
Polynesian peoples to move to New Zealand (and thence to Australia) and to the 
U.S.A.  Yet the boundaries also reflect limits, for rights of access remain 
restricted.  Migration and circulation through the interstices of national 
boundaries has allowed Polynesian people to participate in an emerging regional 
labour market in the Pacific but future liberalisation of such a market is far from 
certain.  Polynesian engagement within this market will continue to depend on 
their ability to negotiate and manage resources and constraints associated with 
skills, education, kinship, multiple nationalities and remittances. 
 
The new Polynesian Triangle, even more than the old, spans the Pacific Ocean 
and though new technologies of movement and communication have perhaps 
lessened the importance of an oceanic character to the region and its people, the 
idea of the Pacific Ocean as a realm of opportunity and exchange remains 
(Hau’ofa 1993).  People, ideas, money, goods and services flow throughout the 
triangle through networks of kin, culture, politics and business.  As Cluny 
Macpherson has noted current “models of the consequences of diaspora lead us 
to attend either to the setting from which the diaspora began or that in which 
diasporic communities have become established … [thus we tend] to consider 
parent and/or migrant societies as separate entities rather than as parts of the 
same society.” However, in reality, “these groups are increasingly tied together 
and regard themselves as part of some larger entity” (Macpherson 1997: 95-96).   
 
However, although it may be tempting to see an imbalance in power and wealth 
between the metropolitan countries on the margins of the triangle and the islands 
at its centre, enduring features of the Polynesian Triangle remind us that the 
island heartlands are far from passive and powerless.  Indeed, they are often the 
source as well as the destination of many of the resources that flow throughout 
the region and many kin networks remained anchored to – and controlled from - 
the home islands (Scheyvens, forthcoming).  In addition, there are often-
unobserved interactions across and within the Triangle: it is not simply a matter 
of interactions between the island centre and the metropolitan rim. 
 
This new conception of a Polynesian Triangle has value in contemporary analyses 
of development in the Pacific Island region.  The Triangle is a device which 
focuses our attention on the often-overlooked social, political and cultural 
dimensions of development processes, for purely economic analyses of 
remittances or migration, for example, fail to capture many of the subtleties and 
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enduring characteristics of the way Polynesian people experience and guide 
development.  Such cultural dimensions are long-standing, durable and cross-
generational in ways that transcend simple and rational economic calculations.  
 
These re-conceptions of a Polynesian Triangle point to a need for different 
conceptual frameworks, methods and units of analysis for research in and on the 
region.  This is a broad region still cut in important ways by national boundaries 
and subsequent restrictions of movement; yet a re-spatialisation of the region, 
standing above those national boundaries, can both deepen and enrich our 
understanding of Polynesia and Polynesians in the contemporary world.  There 
are kin-based lines of movement and communication; there are regional 
clusterings of people and organisations; there are different levels of cultural 
identification; and there is a multi-layered architecture of governance.  The 
challenge for research is to find and employ both qualitative and quantitative 
tools and methods that draw on multiple disciplines to enhance our understanding 
of this complex development space.  
 
 
 
Notes
                                          
1 We acknowledge that that many of the features of Polynesian movement we 
identify as occurring over most of the islands with links to New Zealand, Australia 
or the USA may well also be evident in francophone Polynesia and it might even 
be argued that a Polynesian triangle might even stretch to metropolitan France, 
given the rights of French citizenship that are enjoyed by the residents of French 
Polynesia.  However, such an argument is beyond the scope of this paper and 
requires further research on this important aspect of Polynesian mobility.  
2 The only group of islands not claimed by a European power during this process 
was the modern day Kingdom of Tonga.  
3 Up until the mid-1980s New Zealanders did not require a passport to travel to 
Australia (and vice versa). With New Zealand’s large Polynesian population, and 
the general ease of movement of Polynesian populations into New Zealand up 
until that point in time, we can safely assume that some Polynesian migration 
occurred through this New Zealand-Australian link.  
4  In a study on the relationship between Māori inter-regional migration, 
unemployment and Iwi affiliation Rhema Vaithianathan found that Māori were 
willing to live in an area of high unemployment if that area happened to be their 
traditional tribal homeland. (Vaithianathan 1995: 140-141)   
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